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THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY AND THE LAW OF ZONING
Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Zoning Hearing Board, I Pa. Cmwlth. 458, 275
A.2d 702 (1971)*
The Borough Township Zoning Ordinance expressly excluded gaso-
line stations from the district zoned C, Commercial, in which plaintiff's
lot lay. Since the other districts in the township were zoned residential,
the Zoning Regulation by implication extended the prohibition to the
whole township. Plaintiff requested a permit to build a gasoline station
on his lot, but both the Township Borough Council and the Borough
Zoning Board denied his application. Plaintiff appealed the denial of the
permit to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County on the
grounds that the ordinance prohibiting gasoline stations throughout the
township was an unconstitutional taking of property without due pro-
cess of law. The court held that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient
evidence to overcome the presumption of constitutional validity attached
to a municipal zoning ordinance. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsyl-
vania' reversed, holding that after plaintiff demonstrates that a munici-
pal zoning ordinance totally prohibits a legitimate land use, the munici-
pality bears the burden of producing evidence to show that the ordinance
bears a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare.
In the first zoning case decided by the Supreme Court, it was held that
a municipality, in enacting zoning laws, acts as a legislative body. 2 A
zoning ordinance enacted by a municipality in accordance with state
enabling statutes is presumed to be constitutional. The ordinance will be
upheld as constitutional unless the provisions are clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare.' A plaintiff who challenges the constitution-
ality of a zoning ordinance bears the burden of proof that the ordinance
lacks a reasonable basis.4 Under the traditional presumption of constitu-
* The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently affirmed Beaver's holding, but remanded the case
to the Zoning Hearing Board to allow the borough to produce additional evidence. Beaver Gasoline
Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 148 March Term (Pa. Sup. Ct. Dec. 29, 1971).
I. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania was established by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act
of 1970 to hear some cases, principally zoning cases, formerly heard by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania.
2. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
3. Id. at 395.
4. Id.
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tionality, almost all courts5 have held that a plaintiff who attacks a
zoning ordinance has the burden of pleading its invalidity and the burden
of negating every reasonable basis upon which the ordinance could be
sustained.'
In the face of these seemingly conclusive holdings, two courts have
recently required a municipality to produce the reasons relating its ordi-
nance to the public health, safety, and welfare, before a plaintiff chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the ordinance has attacked its reasona-
bleness. 7 These courts have made a distinction between the burden of
persuasion and the burden of production of evidence.' The burden of
persuading the court of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance rests on
the plaintiff throughout the trial. If, however, the plaintiff can show that
the effect of the ordinance greatly decreases the value of his land, he can
discharge his lesser burden of producing evidence, and can, therefore,
require defendant municipality to bring forward evidence relating the
ordinance to the public health, safety, and general welfare.' This differ-
entiation between two types of burden of proof is beneficial to the plain-
tiff. He need not try to guess the municipality's reasons for passing the
ordinance in order to attack them.'0 Moreover, this approach encourages
5. R. Anderson, I AMIERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2-15 (1968) (hereinafter cited as ANDERSON);
101 C.J.S. Zoning § 368 (1958).
6. Cole v. City of Osceola, -Ia. - 179 N.W.2d 524, 528 (1970).
7. Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P.2d 290 (1970); Junar
Const. Co. v. Town Bd. of Hampstead, 57 Misc. 2d 727, 293 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. 1968). This
view has apparently been upheld in New York in Sacha v. Smith, 33 App. Div. 2d 835, 306
N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div.), affd 26 N.Y.2d 1005, 259 N.E.2d 738, 311 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1970). But
see Contino v. Village of Hempstead, 33 App. Div. 2d 1048, 309 N.Y.S.2d 130 (App. Div.), rev'd
27 N.Y.2d 701, 262 N.E.2d 221, 314 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1970). A similar analysis has developed in
relation to the presumption of administrative regularity when a variance is requested from a zoning
board. Fulling v. Palumbo, 21 N.Y.2d 30, 233 N.E.2d 272; 286 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1967).
8. This analysis of burden of proof can be traced to J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 355-64 (1898).
9. "[W]hile the burden of proving unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt remains on the
property owner throughout the case, evidence of such injury or loss shifts to the municipality the
burden of going forward with the proof that the area restriction bears reasonable relationship to
health, welfare, or safety . . ." Junar Const. Co. v. Town Bd. of Hampstead, 57 Misc. 2d 727,
728, 293 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360 (Sup. Ct. 1968). "At the beginning of the trial in the instant case, the
plaintiff-respondent (Cole-Collister) bore the 'burden of proof' to show that the zoning ordinance
in question was invalid. In order to do this the plaintiff-respondent (Cole-Collister) had to introduce
evidence to overcome the presumption of validity attached to the ordinance. Once the presumption
of validity was overcome, the burden of proof shifted to Boise City to produce evidence tending to
show that the erection of a filling station would in fact interfere with the goals articulated by the
regulations in question." Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 568-
69, 468 P.2d 290, 301 (1970).




administrative efficiency. In order to provide a complete record for
possible judicial review, initial hearings before municipal zoning boards
can be restructured to require introduction of evidence in support of the
ordinance at that time, rather than waiting until an appeal has been
taken to the courts."
Nevertheless, these results are not consistent with the traditional pres-
umption of constitutionality in the law of zoning.' 2 The problem lies in
the meaning and effect which the courts give to the word "presump-
tion." The ordinary definition of a presumption, adopted by the major-
ity of courts today, 3 simply fixes a burden of producing evidence on one
party or the other, and can be overcome on a showing that the contrary
is at least rationally probable." These ordinary presumptions can be
used by the courts for administrative convenience; they are often em-
ployed to require one party to produce evidence peculiarly within his
knowledge.' 5 But there is another kind of presumption, which, for rea-
sons of public policy or substantive law, places an extraordinary burden
on the party moving against it."6 For example, the presumption of legiti-
macy of a child born to married parents or the presumption of innocence
in criminal trials places a heavy burden on the party against whom the
presumption is raised. Such presumptions cannot be overcome by a mere
showing of contrary probabilities. '7 The presumption of constitutionality
places this sort of extraordinary burden on the plaintiff to show that a
zoning ordinance is unreasonable and arbitrary." Most courts in zoning
cases require the plaintiff to show unconstitutionality "beyond a reason-
I1. Note, Land Use Control 22 SYR. L. REV. 291, 293 (1971).
12. Id. at 295.
13. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
LITIGATION 77 (1956).
14. Id. See also F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 260-61 (1956).
15. F. JAMES, JR.. supra note 14, at 262.
16. E. MORGAN. supra note 13. at 77. Even Thayer was forced to recognize this sort of a
presumption. J. THAYER, supra note 8, at 336-37. The California Evidence Code has made a clear
distinction between the two types:
A presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is a presumption established to
implement no public policy other than to facilitate the determination of the particular action
in which the presumption is applied.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 603 (Deering 1966).
A presumption affecting the burden of proof is a presumption established to implement some
public policy other than to facilitate the determination of the particular action in which the
presumption is applied ....
CAL. EVID. CODE § 605 (Deering 1966).
17. E. MORGAN, supra note 13 at 77. J. THAYER, supra note 8, at 336-37.
18. ANDERSON § 2-14.
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able doubt,"19 or by "clear and convincing evidence," 20 or by similar
language.21
There are many policy reasons behind the strong presumption of con-
stitutionality traditionally applied to zoning ordinances. A zoning ordi-
nance is a legislative decision, to be accorded the same deference as state
or federal legislation.22 The local municipal governing body ordinarily
has more knowledge of local affairs and expertise in fashioning ordi-
nances to suit local conditions.? Finally, the presumption acts to protect
the municipality from harassing attacks on its zoning plans. 24 It seems
hardly justified to discard the traditional presumption of constitution-
ality simply because it is easier for a plaintiff to challenge the ordinance
or because it might be administratively more convenient.
This is not to say, however, that there can never be a justification for
discarding the traditional strong presumption of constitutionality sur-
rounding zoning ordinances. In two recent cases, Appeal of Girshz and
Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.,21 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
viewed certain suburban zoning ordinances so skeptically that the court,
in effect, placed the burden of persuasion on the municipalities to justify
the ordinances. 27 The court decided that these ordinances, which prohib-
ited apartment buildings2 and established minimum-size building lots, 2
had the effect of keeping inner-city people out of the suburban township
by raising housing prices higher than low or medium income families
could afford ° Therefore, the court held that a zoning ordinance adopted
19. See, e.g., Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. City of West Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 637,96 N.W.2d
85 (1959).
20. See, e.g., LaSalle Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Cook County, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957).
21. See. e.g., E.B. Elliott Adv. Co. v. Metropolitan Dade Co., 294 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Fla. 1968);
City of St. Petersburg v. Aiken, 217 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1968). See also ANDERSON § 2-14.
22. ANDERSON § 2-14.
23. Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896, 900 (1970).
24. Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P. 2d 290 (1970)
(dissenting opinion).
25. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A. 2d 395 (1970).
26. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. (also reported as Concord Township Appeal), 439 Pa. 466,
268 A.2d 765 (1970). See also National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
27. Symposium: Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYR. L. REv. 465, 568 (1971) (hereinafter cited as
Symposium); Strong, 22 ZONING DIGEST 100a (1970);Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Exclusion-
ary Zoning: From Bilbar to Girsh-A Decade of Change, 17 VILL. L. REv. 507 (1971).
28. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
29. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. (also reported as Concord Township Appeal), 439 Pa. 466,
268 A.2d 765 (1970).
30. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 242, 263 A.2d 395, 397 (1970); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders,
Inc. (also reported as Concord Township Appeal), 439 Pa. 466, 474, 268 A.2d 765, 768-69 (1970).




for the purpose of impeding growth in the suburbs is unconstitutional,31
and that the burden is on the municipality to show that the ordinance
will not have this result.32 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been
congratulated for recognizing the extraterritorial effect a zoning ordi-
nance may have in excluding the urban poor from the suburbs.3 By
protecting the rights of the urban poor to live in the suburbs, the court
has, however, discarded the traditional due process formula, 34 which
balanced the interests of the landowner in the community against the
interests of the municipality in protecting the public health, safety, and
general welfare.3 5 The court did not, unfortunately, offer a new rationale
to include the interests of the urban poor in deciding the constitutionality
of local zoning ordinances .3
One answer to this problem has been to view exclusionary zoning as
a denial of equal protection of the law to those excluded from the sub-
urbs.3 7 Reasoning by analogy to recent Supreme Court cases dealing
with statutes which discriminate against indigents' rights to criminal
appeals, 38 or the franchise, 39 some commentators view exclusionary zon-
ing as discrimination against lower-income people, since it effectively
denies them access to decent places to live and work." Although the
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on exclusionary zoning, at least one
federal court has recognized that the equal protection argument may be
applicable. 41 Moreover, if the equal protection argument is accepted by
31. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 469-70, 263 A.2d 395, 396 (1970). "Thinly veiled justifications
of exclusionary zoning will not be countenanced by this court." Appeal of Kit-Mar Buildings, Inc.
(also reported as Concord Township Appeal), 439 Pa. 466, 478, 268 A.2d 765, 770 (1970). See also
Washburn, Apartments in the Suburbs: In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 74 DICK. L. Rav. 634, 650
(1970) (hereinafter cited as Washburn).
32. Symposium at 569.
33. Id. at 573.
34. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning. Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21
STAN. L. REv. 767, 784 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Sager).
35. Washburn at 649-50.
36. Id.
37. Sager at 784-85. Other articles generally favoring an equal protection argument applied to
exclusionary zoning include Symposium; Washburn; Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal
Protection, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1645 (1971); Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE
L.J. 896 (1970).
38. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
39. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
40. Sager at 785; Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1645,
1649-50 (1971).
41. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, 424 F.7
, 
""
Cir. 1970). See also Symposium at 575.
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the courts, it seems likely that the traditional presumption of constitu-
tionality will, as in the Pennsylvania cases,42 be discarded.43 The Supreme
Court has viewed discrimination based on race or income with such
disfavor44 that it has in such cases required the state to demonstrate a
compelling justification for the classification made by the statute.45
The Beaver court seems to say that an ordinance which prohibits
gasoline stations from a municipality has the same discriminatory effect
as one that excludes people and should be treated accordingly. The court
finds it significant that the ordinance in Beaver totally excluded a land
use,4" as did the ordinance in Appeal of Girsh,4 in which the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania overturned the presumption of constitutionality.
The Beaver court places major reliance, however, on an earlier decision
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment.45 The court in Exton upheld a municipality's power to
selectively prohibit land uses, but held that these prohibitions must bear
a "more substantial relationship" to the public health, safety, and gen-
eral welfare.49 Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in that case
specifically reaffirmed the presumption of constitutionality surrounding
a zoning ordinance,," the Beaver court finds in the "more substantial
relationship" demanded from a prohibitory ordinance the factor neces-
sary to place on the municipality the burden of justifying the discrimina-
tion between excluded businesses and those which "enjoy the blessing of
the municipality."-" The Beaver court holds that the township must
supply the reasons for its ordinance in order to insure the "equal protec-
tion of the prohibited business."152
The Beaver court's extension of the cases dealing with exclusionary
zoning to ordinances which prohibit commercial land uses can be criti-
cized. The court's reliance on Appeal of Girsh53 is misplaced. The Penn-
42. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A. 2d 395 (1970); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. (also
reported as Concord Township Appeal), 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
43. Sager at 784.
44. Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 40, at 1650-51..
45. Id. See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967).
46. 1 Pa. Cmwlth. at - 275 A.2d at 702-03.
47. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
48. 425 Pa.43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967).
49. Id. at 61, 228 A.2d at 179.
50. Id. at 58, 228 A.2d at 178.
51. 1 Pa. Cmwlth. at _ 275 A.2d at 705.
52. Id.
53. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss4/9
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sylvania Supreme Court in that case expressly limited the holding to the
right of people to live on land and declared that this was a different
proposition from ordinary business uses of land. 5 Equally mistaken is
the Beaver court's assumption that the presumption of constitutionality
should be overturned. Except in cases of statutes which discriminate on
grounds of wealth or race,5 the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff
who challenges a statute as discriminatory has the burden of showing
that the classification made by the statute does not rest on a reasonable
basis.56
The immediate impact of the Beaver holding is to make it more
difficult for the township to prohibit a land use. 57 The plaintiff need only
show that the ordinance is, indeed, prohibitory in order to shift to the
municipality the burden of supporting its ordinance.58 In addition, in
order to sustain its ordinance, the municipality must not only show that
it is necessary for the public health, safety, and welfare but must also
show that the undesirable effects which necessitated the ordinance are
not also caused by permitted uses or that they are not amenable to
regulation instead of prohibition. 9 Since the township in Beaver pre-
sented no evidence to support its ordinance, it is not clear exactly how
much or what kind of evidence is required.
Still, the Beaver court's overturning of the presumption of constitu-
tionality and its placing of the burden on the municipality to defend its
ordinance may have even greater significance. The presumption of con-
stitutionality surrounding zoning ordinances rests on the assumption
that zoning is best left in local hands.6" By overthrowing the presumption
of constitutionality, the foundation of local control of zoning itself is
called into question. The extraterritorial effects of local zoning laws
54. "'it is not true that the logical result of our holding today is that a municipality must provide
for all types of land use. This case deals with the right of people to live on land, a very different
problem than whether appellee must allow certain industrial uses within its borders." Appeal of
Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 245-46, 263 A.2d 395. 399 (1970).
55. See notes 43 and 44 supra and accompanying text.
56. Sager at 768-69. See also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). But cf Morey
v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
57. Washburn at 660. Washburn argues that reading Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d
395 (1970), and Exton Quarries. Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967),
together make it difficult for a municipality to exclude any land use whatever. Beaver, by extending
the overthrow of the presumption of constitutionality, increases the difficulties even more.
58. 1 Pa. Cmwlth. at - 275 A.2d at 704.
59. Id. at -., 275 A.2d at 705.
60. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
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which exclude people from suburban townships are already recognized."
As Beaver illustrates, other types of zoning ordinances may also have
an effect beyond the boundaries of the municipality. 2 Not only did the
ordinance ban gasoline stations in the Beaver case, it also banned in-
dustrial structures, liquor stores, refreshment stands, lunch counters, tea
rooms, and restaurants.6 Since these essentials are required by the peo-
ple in Borough Township, the prohibition of them makes it necessary
for some adjacent municipality to provide these services. Although the
courts have been slow to recognize the effects of zoning laws beyond
municipal borders,6 4 some courts have noted that a municipality may be
required to consider regional needs when drawing up commercial zoning
ordinances.6" For example, a local ordinance prohibiting shopping cen-
ters in a municipality may not be justified if a location in that municipal-
ity best satisfies regional needs.66
The Beaver court's holding does not deal effectively with the extrater-
ritorial effect of the prohibitory ordinance. The municipality must jus-
tify its ordinance in terms of the general welfare, but this general welfare
includes only the people in the municipality. Nowhere does the Beaver
court weigh the interests and capabilities of surrounding townships
which must also bear the effect of a prohibitory ordinance. To deal with
the extraterritorial effect of ordinances which exclude people, many
commentators67 have suggested metropolitan or regional control of zon-
ing.68 A similar scheme, or at least a compulsory coordination of zoning
plans among adjacent municipalities, may also be the answer to the
extraterritorial effects of prohibitory zoning ordinances such as the one
in Beaver.69
61. See notes 27-32 supra and accompanying text.
62. Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 107.
63. 1 Pa. Cmwlth. at - 275 A.2d at 711-12.
64. Zoning, supra note 62, at 107.
65. Zoning, supra note 62, at 118. See also Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d
397 (Mo. 1963); Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958).
66. Zoning, supra note 62, at 121. See also Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d
397 (Mo. 1963).
67. Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896, 924 (1970); Symposium at
588-97; Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. (also reported as Concord Township Appeal), 439 Pa.
466, 476, 268 A.2d 765, 769 (1970); Vickers v. Township Comm'n, of Gloucester Township, 37
N.J. 232, 254, 181 A.2d 129, 141 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
68. For a discussion of the benefits of local control of zoning, see Note, The Constitutionality
of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896, 900 (1970); A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 73-
103, ch. V (1835).
69. Zoning, supra note 62, at 124-25.
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